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LEGAL PROCESSES OF CHANGE:
ARTICLE 2(4) AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES
Stuart Ford
This article was originally submitted in completion of an LL.M.
at the University of Nottingham.

INTRODUCTION
In 1945, in the wake of two World Wars in the space of thirty years, the United
Nations was founded to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"' by
maintaining international peace and security.2 The key to achieving this goal was
and is regulating the use of force by states. At the heart of this regulation is the
prohibition on the use of force in international relations contained in Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter. However, the Charter contains more than a legal
prohibition, and the Security Council was created to act as an executive body which
would oversee enforcement of the United Nations' principles using its considerable
Chapter VII powers. I Accordingly, the Council was given "primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security."
The legal regime devised in 1945 presupposed considerable co-operation between
the permanent members in the execution of the Security Council's role, but the Cold
War soon divided East and West and eliminated any hope of co-operation.5 The
permanent member veto became a weapon that both sides used to paralyze the
Council. Over the next fifty years many acts occurred which were apparent violations
of the textual interpretation of Article 2(4).6 Yet, until recently the Security Council
had seemed incapable of effectively using its enforcement powers against a violator.'
This failure has led some prominent writers to argue that the recurrent violations
have weakened or eliminated the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article
2(4).8
This paper does not directly address the status of Article 2(4). Rather, it attempts
to show how state practice over the last fifty years could have changed the legal
U.N.Charter Preamble.
2
3

5
6

7

9

Ibid. art. 1(1).
See N.D. White, Keeping the Peace (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2nd ed.
1997) pp.3-5; T.M. Franck, "Who Killed Article 2(4)". (1970) 64 A.J.I.L. p.809 at p.810.
U.N.Charter art. 24(1).
See White, supra n.3, at pp.4-5; Franck, supra n.3, at p. 8 10.
See A.C. Arend. "International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms", (1990)
27 Stan.J. Int7 L. p.1 at 10-18; Franck, supra n.3, at pp.810-11.
See Arend, supra n.6, at p.7.
See infra pp. 83-84
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content of the prohibition on the use of force. The first part contains a discussion of
the textual interpretation of Article 2(4) as well as an overview of the argument that
state practice has eliminated the prohibition on the use of force. The second part
examines how state practice could have modified Article 2(4) and argues that there
has generally not been the requisite opiniojuris to create a new customary norm, or
intentionally abandon the norm in Article 2(4). It concludes that most apparent
violations are best seen as "interpretive acts". The third part argues that interpretive
acts in the form of state practice are subject to requirements of agreement and good
faith, and proposes a definition of good faith agreement. Interpretive acts which do
not demonstrate good faith agreement cannot modify the legal content of Article
2(4). The fourth part will apply the definition of good faith agreement to a few examples
of state practice to determine whether that practice was an authoritative interpretation
of the Charter. The final part will draw some conclusions about the relationship
between custom formation and treaty interpretation, the relationship between
interpretive acts and the proposed definition of good faith agreement, and offer
some tentative suggestions on the current status of Article 2(4).

ARTICLE 2(4)
The Covenant of the League of Nations
The prohibition on force in Article 2(4) is best appreciated by comparison to its
predecessors. 9 In addition, the historical background may well be a supplementary
means of interpretation of the Charter.'0 One of the first notable attempts to regulate
the use of force amongst the international community was the Covenant of the
League of Nations, which was signed after World War L" Members promised to
'respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League". 2 However, this
provision was qualified in so many ways that the prohibition on force ended up
being a procedural rather than a substantive prohibition. 3
The procedural loopholes in the Covenant's regulation of the use of force were
extensive. Members were obliged to submit their disputes to arbitration, judicial
settlement or the League Council. 4 If the dispute was submitted to arbitration or
See E. Gordon, "Article 2(4) in Historical Context", (1985) 10 Yale J. Int'l L. p.271 (discussing
the evolution of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations).
10 See 1. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester

9

University Press, 2nd ed. 1984) 141(discussing Article 32 of the Vienna Convention). For
further discussion of the Vienna Convention, see infra pp. 96-99.
League of Nations Covenant (1919) [Hereinafter Covenant].
12
Ibid. art. 10.
13
See A.C. Arend & R.J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force (London: Routledge,
1993) pp.19-22; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge: Grotius,
2nd ed. 1994) 77-80; H. McCoubrey & N. D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992) pp.20-21.
14 Covenant art. 12(1).
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judicial settlement and a decision was not reached within a reasonable time, then the
parties were free to go to war.' If the dispute was submitted to the Council and the
Council's decision was not unanimous (excluding the disputants), then the parties
were again free to go to war.'6 Even when a decision was reached by the arbitrators,
the adjudicators, or the Council, if one party did not comply with the decision then
the other party was free to take any action.' 7 Also, the Council was precluded from
making any recommendation about a dispute which arose out of a matter which was
entirely within the "domestic jurisdiction" of a party,' 8 which again left the parties
free to use self-help.
On top of the procedural loopholes written into the Covenant, the limited extent
of the Covenant's application created two more flaws. First, the provisions of the
Covenant only applied where the parties to a dispute were both members of the
League. Members were free to go to war with non-members. 9 Secondly, the
prohibitions in the Covenant applied only to "war." Uses of force short of war were
not regulated by the Covenant.20

The Kellogg-Briand Pact
Both states and theorists were aware of the deficiencies of the Covenant and
perceived the need for tighter regulation of the use of force. Consequently, in 1928
the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed. 21 In Article I of the Pact, the Parties renounced
war as an instrument of national policy:
"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare ... that they condemn recourse
to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."
In Article II, the parties agreed to settle all disputes by pacific means:
"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."
The result was a comprehensive prohibition on aggressive war between parties to
the Pact.

See ibid. art. 12(2); Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.79.
See Covenant art. 15(7).
17 Ibid. art. 13(4).
18 Ibid. art. 15(8).
19
See Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.80. But see Covenant art. 17.
20 See Arend & Beck, supra n.13, at p.22.
21
The formal name of the Pact is the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument
of National Policy (1928), 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1929).
's
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Despite eliminating the procedural loopholes of the Covenant, some uses of
force remained legal. Wars of self-defence were still legal, even though there was no
definition of self-defence. 22 In addition, the Pact was limited in its extent in a similar
way to the Covenant. The terms of the Pact limited its application to the relations
between contracting parties, 23 and the Pact prohibited "war" and left uses of force
24
short of war unregulated.

A Textual Interpretationof Article 2(4)
The prohibition on the use of force contained in the United Nations Charter was not
created in a vacuum but rather evolved over time.25 The Covenant of the League of
Nations was a response to the legal regime which was believed to have resulted in
the First World War. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was a response to the inadequacies of
the Covenant, and the Charter is a response to the perceived need for stronger
26
international regulation of the use of force following the Second World War.
Understanding how Article 2(4) evolved is immensely helpful in understanding why
it is drafted as it is.
Before turning to Article 2(4), it is necessary to briefly consider the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 27 The Vienna Convention does not directly
apply to the United Nations Charter because the Charter was concluded before the
Convention entered into force. 8 However, many of the Convention's provisions
codify customary international law, and it is generally accepted that the principle
provision on treaty interpretation, Article 3 1, states the customary rule.29 As a starting
point then, a treaty should be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose"."
It is now time to examine the text of Article 2(4), which states that:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."

22

See Arend & Beck, supra n.13, at pp.22-23; Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.83.

23

See Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.83.
See Arend & Beck. supra n.13, at p.23; Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.83; McCoubrey & White,

24

supra n.13, at p.22.

26

See Gordon, supra n.9, at pp.273-75 (tracing the evolution of the prohibition since WWI).
See Dinstein, supra n.13, at pp.83-84. See also U.N.Charter Preamble.

17

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1980) [Hereinafter

I

Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention will be discussed in greater detail infra pp. 9699.
,S See Vienna Convention art. 4.
19 See infra p. 96.
30 Vienna Convention art. 31.
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The language of Article 2(4), when given its "ordinary meaning" within the overall
scheme of the Charter,3' has four principle effects:
1.

It prohibits "Members" from using or threatening force against "any state".
Consequently the ban on force is not limited to situations where all the
disputants are members of the United Nations.32 This cures one of the flaws
in the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

2.

The prohibition applies to the "international relations" of members. This
means that the prohibition does not limit purely intra-state uses of force.33
This interpretation is bolstered by Article 2(7) of the Charter which prohibits
the UN from intervening in the "domestic jurisdiction of any state".

3.

Article 2(4) avoids the term "war" which caused so much criticism of the
Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.34 Instead,
Article 2(4) prohibits "the threat or use of force". "War" was problematic
because it suggested a certain level of hostilities and implied that more limited
uses of force were not covered by the earlier prohibitions. 35 "[U]se of force"
was adopted in place of "war" so that all military operations would violate the
ban. The phrase "threat or use of force" extends the ban even further by
prohibiting all threats of military force as well as all military actions. 36 This
cures a second fundamental flaw of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

4.

The prohibition is not weakened by the phrase "against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state" because of the final phrase: "or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".37 If
Article 2(4) did not include the final phrase, it would be open to the
interpretation that there existed uses of force which did not effect the territorial
integrity or political independence of the state against which they were
directed. These uses of force might then exist outside the ban in Article 2(4).38

In fact, such an argument was advanced by the government of the United Kingdom
shortly after the birth of the UN. In October of 1946, two British warships struck
mines while passing through the Corfu Channel, in an area which was within Albanian
territorial waters.3 9 In November 1946, the British navy returned and mounted a
minesweeping operation in the Corfu Channel, thus entering Albanian territorial
waters with warships and conducting an essentially military operation.4" In defence
31

See Sinclair, supra n.10, at p.121 (noting that "there is no such thing as an abstract ordinary
meaning of a phrase, divorced from the place which that phrase occupies in the text").

32 See Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.92.

33 See ibid. at p.84.
34 See Arend, supra n.6, at pp.3-4.
3 See Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.84; 0. Schachter, 'The Right of States to Use Armed Force',
(1984) 82 Mich. L. Rev. p.1620, at p.1624.
See Arend, supra n.6, at pp.26-27; Schachter, supra n.35, at p.1625.
37
See Dinstein, supra n.13, at pp.84-86; McCoubrey & White, supra n.13, at pp.25- 2 6.
3
See Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.85.
3 See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 1949, pp.12-13.
See ibid. at p.33.

80

S Ford

of the minesweeping, the United Kingdom argued that a limited right of self-help
continued to exist under the Charter where the use of force "threatened neither the
territorial integrity nor the political independence' of the target state.4 ' The final
phrase of Article 2(4) negates arguments of this type by requiring that any threat or
42
use of force be consistent with the "Purposes of the United Nations".

The Purposes of the United Nations Charter
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties indicates that the "object
and purpose" of a treaty should be considered in the interpretation of a treaty
provision, but Article 2(4) makes reference to the purposes of the Charter an explicit
and primary part of interpreting the prohibition on the use of force. Ian Sinclair has
argued that the "object and purpose" approach to treaty interpretation will often be
a "secondary or ancillary process." But Sinclair acknowledges that this hierarchy
can be "short-circuited" where the object and purpose of a treaty "exercise[s] a
determining influence".4 3 The last phrase of Article 2(4) is a concrete example of a
situation where the "object and purpose" of a treaty provision exerts a determining
influence. When deciding whether a threat or use of force violates Article 2(4), one
must always consider whether it is "inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations".
The purposes of the UN are laid out in Article 1 of the Charter. All of the purposes
are important, but Article 1(1) contains the primary purpose of the Charter,' and the
one most applicable to uses of force. Article 1(1) directs the UN:
"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."
Article 1(1) makes it clear that the purpose of the UN is to maintain international
peace and security. Measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace or breaches
of the peace are envisioned, but should be collective (i.e., United Nations) measures.
41

42
43

Statement by Sir Eric Beckett of the U.K. (U.K. v. Alb.), 1950 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Corfu
Channel) p.296. In the resulting case, the ICJ concluded that the minesweeping was illegal,
though there is no specific reference to the last phrase of Article 2(4). Corfu Channel (U.K.
v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. p.4, at p.35. The adverse ruling necessarily rejects the British
contention that the use of force was legal because it effected neither the territorial integrity
nor the political independence of Albania. but it is unfortunate that the decision does not
explicitly turn on the last phrase of Article 2(4).
Cf. Schachter. supra n.35, at p.1626.
Sinclair, supra n.10, at p.130.
See Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.85.
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It is not intended that states be able to act unilaterally against threats to or breaches
of the peace. This conclusion is strengthened by Article 2(3) of the Charter, which
directs members to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means". Clearly
the unilateral use of force by a state would contradict the obligation to settle disputes
by peaceful means.
Adjustment or settlement of international disputes is to be sought in conformity
with the principles ofjustice and international law, but only through "peaceful means".
If there is a conflict between peace and justice, Article 1(1) indicates that peace is
paramount.45 For instance, Article 1(2) makes the development of "equal rights and
self-determination" a purpose of the United Nations, but this would still be subject
to Article 1(1). Justice, in the form of equal rights or self-determination, could not be
sought by an individual state at the expense of peace. 46 In essence, the Charter
advocates the improvement of the status quo through peaceful means, but condemns
the unilateral use of force to modify the status quo.

Article 2(4): A Comprehensive Ban on the Threat or Use of Force
The result of a textual interpretation of Article 2(4) is a comprehensive ban: any
threat or use of interstate armed force is prohibited whether the target is a UN
member or not. 47 Article 2(4) creates a general prohibition that avoids the flaws
which weakened the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand
Pact. In fact, if it were not for the explicit exceptions to the general ban, all interstate
uses of force would be illegal. 48 For this reason the general ban has two specific
exceptions. These exceptions are for self-defence (Article 51) and for UN-authorized
4
collective security (Article 42). 1
When discussing self-defence and collective security, it is important to remember
the relationship between Article 2(4) and Articles 51 and 42. Article 2(4) creates a
general ban, and Article 5 1 and 42 are specific exceptions to that ban. As.such, they
are subordinate to Article 2(4), and cannot be interpreted without reference to Article
2(4). The emphasis in Article 2(4) on the purposes of the UN applies equally to the
interpretation of Articles 51 and 42. When examining the extent of these two
provisions, particularly Article 51, one must keep in mind the last phrase of Article
2(4).

See Arend & Beck, supra n.13, at p.40; Arend, supra n.6, at pp.5-6.
See Arend, supra n.6, at pp.5-6.
47 See Dinstein, supra n.13, at p.86; McCoubrey & White, supra n.13, at p.24.
See Dinstein, supra n.13, at pp.87-88.
49 There is also an essentially defunct exception for action taken against the enemy states of
WWII. See U.N.Charter arts. 53, 107. The provision in Article 53 which allows the Security
Council to delegate enforcement powers to a regional organization is not an additional
exception, but rather a method by which the Security Council can implement its power under
45
4

Article 42.
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Subsequent State Practice
On paper at least, Article 2(4) creates a comprehensive and relatively simple legal
norm. However, it did not take long for commentators to note that states did not act
in accordance with the prohibition on the threat or use of force. As early as 1946, in
minesweeping the Corfu Channel, the United Kingdom violated the textual
interpretation of Article 2(4).1o The British argument that the minesweeping operation
was legal because it did not violate the territorial integrity or political independence
of Albania ignored the last phrase of Article 2(4). And this was just the beginning,
far greater violations were to follow.
Over the next fifty years, North Korea invaded South Korea, India invaded Goa,
Indonesia invaded East Timor, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Afghanistan, while the United States invaded the Dominican Republic, Grenada,
and Panama. And these are just some of the most egregious violations of Article
2(4). In 1970, Thomas Franck pointed out that there had been more than one hundred
outbreaks of interstate hostility since the signing of the United Nations Charter.5' He
also noted that there had been only one occasion when the UN had been able to
mount a collective enforcement operation, and only then because the Soviet Union
was absent from the Security Council.5 2 Franck's conclusion was that state practice
between 1945 and 1970 had "so severely shattered" Article 2(4) that "only the words
remain[ed]", 3 Franck attributed the death of Article 2(4) to a number of factors,
including: the use of the veto to frustrate the Security Council's enforcement
machinery,5 4 the changing nature of warfare which made it increasingly difficult to
determine when an "armed attack" had occurred,55 and the rise of superpower
dominated regional organizations acting outside of the Security Council's control.56
In 1990, Anthony Clark Arend took up where Franck had left off. Arend canvasses
state practice up to 1990 and also concludes that there have been massive and
recurrent violations of the textual interpretation of Article 2(4) which have practically
eliminated the legal prohibition on the threat or use of force between states.57 Arend
argues that the legal norm as of 1990 was one of "self-help" where states were largely
free to use force to achieve self-defence, self-determination, or justice (all of which
have very broad, subjective legal definitions according to Arend). 8 The only
interstate use of force that Arend believes is still illegal is the use of force solely for
territorial aggrandizement.59 Like Franck, Arend attributes the death of Article 2(4) in
50
51

12
53
54

5
6
57

Is
11

See supra text accompanying ns 39-42.
Franck, supra n.3, at pp.810-11.
Ibid.
Ibid. at p.809.
Ibid. at pp. 8 10-11.
Ibid. at pp. 8 12- 2 0.
Ibid. at pp. 8 22-35.
Arend, supra n.6, at pp.27-28.
Ibid. at pp.28-32.
Ibid. at pp. 3 2- 3 6 .
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part to the failure of the collective security machinery set out in the Charter. 6 Arend
also blames the erosion of Article 2(4) on state self-interest, which places more
importance on a subjective concept of "justice"6 than on "peace", thus reversing the
hierarchy set out in Article 1(1) of the Charter. '
Franck and Arend take the most extreme view of the status of Article 2(4), what
Arend has termed the "rejectionist" approach. Not all commentators accept that
Article 2(4) is dead. 62 In fact, the majority probably fall somewhere between a "legalist"
position63 (one which follows an essentially textual interpretation of the Charter's
prohibition on the use of force) and a "rejectionist" position.' It is not the purpose
of this section to present a comprehensive discussion of the positions taken by
various commentators. Rather, the intent here is to highlight that a majority of writers
accept that Article 2(4) has been changed by state practice, 65 even if they disagree
about how much it has changed. This should raise an immediate question. If the legal
content of Article 2(4) has been changed or eliminated, what was the legal process
by which that change took place.'

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE
Few would disagree that at the moment when the United Nations Charter came into
force it was the law between those states that were party to it and on those issues
which it covered. This means that in the beginning, the textual interpretation of
Article 2(4) was the law governing the threat or use of force in international relations. 6
If the law governing the use of force is now different, as the majority of writers
suggest, we must explain that change.
The Charter was the product of a process of intemational law (treaty formation).
For the legal norms in the Charter to have changed, we must identify a legal process
by which that change occurred.67 It is not sufficient, as Franck has done, to catalogue

60
61
62

63
64

6
66

67

Ibid. at pp.6-10.
Ibid. at pp.10-18.
See ibid. at pp.18-28 (giving an overview of the positions taken by commentators). See, e.g.,
W.M. Reisman, 'Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Article 2(4)', (1984) 78 AJ.I.L.
p.642, at p.643(arguing that Article 2(4) must be broadly reinterpreted to allow international
uses of force which "enhance opportunities for ongoing self-determination").
See e.g., 0. Schachter, "The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force", (1985) 10 Yale J. Int'l
L. p.291(adopting an essentially 'legalist' position).
See e.g., E.V. Rostow, "The Legality of the International Use of Force by and from States",
(1985) 10 Yale J. Int'l L. p.286, at p.286 (arguing that "a rule of law.., cannot be characterized
as a norm if respect and enforcement are the exceptions rather than the rule").
See Arend, supra n.6, at pp.25-27.
At least, this was true with respect to the parties to the Charter. Since the Charter is now
essentially universal, the question of whether non-parties would be bound by the anterior law
or a parallel customary law is moot.
See Gordon, supra n.9. at p.272 n.2 ("Discrepant behavior is not necessarily probative of a
deliberate intent to change an existing rule. The emergence of a new rule or the fall from
authority of an existing one must rest on a legal justification.")
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a series of apparent violations of the textual interpretation of Article 2(4) and conclude
that therefore Article 2(4) no longer has legal validity. 68Franck's argument goes to
the effectiveness of the prohibition on force, not directly to the legal status of Article
2(4). If some new legal norm now exists, that norm must have been created through
a legal process, and to demonstrate that the legal validity of Article 2(4) has changed,
one must show a legal process by which that change occurred.

Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law
The Statute of the International Court of Justice sets out the sources of international
law:
"The Court whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a.

international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;

b.

international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c.

the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."69

Thus the three sources of international law are treaties, custom, and general principles
of law.7" Treaties are listed before custom, but it has been suggested that this is
largely a matter of judicial convenience. 7 After all, judges are much more likely to

68 See Franck, supra n.3, at p.809 ("The practice of these states has so severely shattered the

mutual confidence which would have been the sine qua non of an operative rule of law...
[that] only the words remain."). Arend achieves a similar result by concluding that international
law must have "authority and control" to be law. supra n.6, at pp.18-19. See also Rostow,

supra n.64 (arguing that a norm must be enforced to be a law). Arend and Franck's arguments
both look most like arguments in favor of desuetude, though it is never specifically mentioned.
Desuetude will be addressed later. See infra pp. 97-99.
69 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1).
70 "General principles" were probably included in the Statute as a source of law to prevent a non
liquet in the absence of an apposite custom or treaty. See S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice
of the International Court, 1920-1996," Vol. 111.376, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 3rd ed.

1997) pp.1601-2. While the position of "general principles" in Article 38 indicates that they
are not formally inferior to customs or treaties, when present, customs and treaties will
usually prevail over general principles because lex specialis derogat generali. Ibid. at pp. 16051606. Since in issues related to Article 2(4) there is a treaty provision clearly on point and no
shortage of apparent violations which may or may not be evidence of a conflicting custom,
"general principles of law" are of little utility. Consequently, general principles will receive no
further attention.
71

See Sinclair, supra n.10, at 2; Michael Akehurst, "The Hierarchy of the Sources of International
Law", (1974-5) 47 B.Y.B.I.L. p.273, at p.274; K. Wolfke, "Treaties and Custom: Aspects of
Interrelation" in J. Klabbers & R. Lefeber (eds)., Essays on the Law of Treaties (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) p. 3 1 at p.37.
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apply treaties first because a state's ratification or accession to a treaty is generally
ascertainable. Determining the existence and extent of a custom, on the other hand,
is often an extremely complex task.7 2 Today, there is general agreement that there is
no hierarchy between treaties and custom.73 Therefore, at a general level, a treaty
may either be supplanted by a new custom, or changed by a recognized treaty
process.7" Part l1.B. will consider the former possibility: that Article 2(4) has been
modified by a new custom. Part H.C. will examine the latter possibility: that treaty
processes might have changed the meaning of Article 2(4).

Modification of Article 2(4) by a Subsequent Custom
This section examines the possible replacement of Article 2(4) by a subsequent
custom. A clear distinction must first be made between the modification of Article
2(4) by a custom which has arisen since 1945 and the continued existence of a preCharter custom which co-exists with Article 2(4). Some authors base a contemporary
customary right of intervention on 19th century customs which have supposedly
survived the introduction of the Charter.75 This is contrary to a textual interpretation
of Article 2(4). The prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) is a comprehensive
ban on the use of force with narrow, limited exceptions. The language used by the
provision covers essentially all international military actions of whatever severity.76
When the Charter came into being in 1945, Article 2(4) extinguished or limited all
See M. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory and
Practice of the Interrelation of Sources (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2nd ed.
1997), p.60 para.89.
73 See Villiger, supra n.72, at pp.57-59, paras.84-86; Akehurst, supra n.71, at p.275; Wolfke,
supra n.71, at p.36.
74 While there is no general problem with a custom supplanting a prior treaty, there may be
specific problems when this is attempted with Article 2(4) of the Charter. First, there is
Article 103 of the Charter, which states that: "In the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail." It may prohibit the modification of Charter commitments. See B.
Sinma (ed)., The Charterof the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994) pp.1117-25. Cf. Vienna Convention art. 30(1). Second, Article 2(4) may be jus
cogens. If this were true, then the Vienna Convention suggests that Article 2(4) could not be
superseded by a custom unless that custom were also jus cogens. See Vienna Convention art.
53. See also Akehurst, supra n.71. at pp.281-85. Both of the above arguments are fraught
with difficulties. For example, it is not at all clear that the Vienna Convention's treatment of
jus cogens would apply to the UN Charter. See infra text accompanying n.147. This paper
resolves the interaction of customs and treaties without resort to either Article 103 or the
possible jus cogens nature of Article 2(4).
75 See Rostow, supra n.64, at p.289 (appearing to rely on the 19th century exchange of
diplomatic n.s referred to as the Caroline case to define self-defence).
76 See supra pp. 78-81.
'n See Gordon, supra n.9, at pp.277-78 (suggesting that the holding of the Caroline case has
been modified to the extent that it allowed anticipatory self-defence in contradiction of the
requirement of an armed attack in Article 51 of the Charter).
7_
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contradictory customs." Mark Villiger has argued that conventions do not
7
automatically extinguish contradictory customs covering the same subject matter. 1
However his argument centers around the fact that non-parties will continue to be
bound by the custom, and even parties to a convention might have to apply the
custom in their relations with non-parties. In the case of the Charter at least, these
arguments are inapplicable. First, Article 2(4) requires that members apply it in their
relations with non-members. Second, the UN achieved nearly universal membership
so quickly, that a contradictory pre-existing custom could not have survived. If
customs currently exist which have modified the legal content of Article 2(4), they
came into being after 1945, though they might mirror pre-Charter customs.
It is also important to make a distinction between customs which might raise the
threshold for the use of force in international relations, and customs which would
lower the threshold for the use of force. It would not be inconsistent with a textual
interpretation of Article 2(4) for a custom to arise which would further limit the right
of states to use force in international relations. In fact, the International Court of
Justice appeared to find just such a custom in various pronouncements of the General
Assembly. 9 However, any attempt to lower the threshold in Article 2(4) through the
creation of a new custom must be examined and explained.

Elements of Custom
The requirements of custom stem from the description of "international custom"
used in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,8° which
describes custom as a "general practice accepted as law"." The description has two
components, and custom consequently consists of a general state practice, plus a
belief that the practice is a legal right or is compelled by law (often referred to as
opinio juris).82 The definitions of the two components are inexact. Compare, for
example, the idea of "constant and uniform" practice required by the ICJ in 1950 3 to
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See Gordon, supra n.9, at pp.277-78 (suggesting that the holding of the Caroline case has
been modified to the extent that it allowed anticipatory self-defence in contradiction of the
requirement of an armed attack in Article 51 of the Charter).
Villiger, supra n.72, at pp.160-161, paras.243-245.
See Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, pp.99-102.
See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Rep. p. 2 66, at pp.276-77.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1).
See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Rep. p.266, at p.276; North Sea Continental Shelf
(F.R.G. v. Denand F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. p.3, at p. 4 ("Not only must the acts
concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such
a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it"); Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 97.
See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Rep. p.266, at p.276.
See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.and F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. p.3, at
p.42.
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the idea of instant custom suggested in 19698 or the loose approach the ICJ took to
contradictory practice in 1986.85 These cases all suggest different approaches to
how uniform, constant, and long a practice needs to have been followed before it
becomes a custom. However, there is broad agreement that custom formation requires
two things:
1.

A general practice among states, plus

2.

A belief that the practice constitutes law (opiniojuris).86

Commentators have little difficulty finding a long history of uses of force which
violate Article 2(4).17 Some authors have used these incidents as evidence of practices
in violation of Article 2(4), though there might be doubt about the constancy or
uniformity of the practices. However, assuming, arguendo, that a practice meets the
first requirement, that practice by itself is insufficient to create a custom which would
modify or supplant Article 2(4). The second necessary element of a new custom is
opinio juris.

Opinio Juris in Violations of Article 2(4)
To best determine whether the requisite opiniojurisexists, it would be necessary to
conduct a review of all the apparent violations of the textual interpretation of Article
2(4) since 1945. However, the shear number of violations puts such an undertaking
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, a sampling of the opinio juris offered by
states engaging in some of the most blatant violations will be examined.
Opiniojurisis a state's belief that the action it is engaging in is either a legal right
or required by international law.' While opiniojurisis a subjective belief, it is only
legally relevant to the extent that other states can perceive it and act on it, which
means that the more obvious the opinio juris, the more likely it is to contribute to a
new custom. The best way to determine a state's opinio juris is from its own
pronouncements, particularly when a state provides a legal rationale for its actions.89
This is an important point. Opiniojurisis a legal belief, and while virtually any public
explanation a state offers can be evidence of it, not all explanations are equally
probative. The most persuasive evidence of a state's belief that its action is either a

See Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. p.14, at p. 98 ("The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be
established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity
with the rule.").
96
See generally Villiger, supra n.72, at pp. 2 9 -55, paras.34-78 (giving an overview of modern
custom formation).
87 See supra pp. 82-83.
8
See Villiger, supra n.72, at pp.47-48, paras.65-66.
89 See ibid. at pp. 5 0 - 5 1, para.71.
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legal right or required by international law results from a state's explanation in a
situation in which there is the possibility of legal liability. States may make multiple
statements on the same issue, many of them in political contexts, some of which may
be mutually inconsistent. The possibility of legal liability produces the best evidence
of a state's legal beliefs.' One of the only forums which has the realistic possibility
of imposing legal liability for violations of the prohibition on the use of force in
international relations is the Security Council. Consequently a state's explanation
before the Security Council is persuasive evidence of opinio juris in violations of
Article 2(4). 1
Some critics may argue, upon reading the following examples, that the rationales
that states put forward are not honest, and that therefore they cannot be used as
evidence of what states actually believed. It is certainly possible to imply opinio
juris from the actions of states if an explicit rationale is not expounded. 92 However, it
would be wrong to try and second guess a state's express rationale. States are aware
of the legal implications of taking a particular position. If they choose to be
disingenuous in explaining their beliefs, it is a conscious decision, the consequences
of which a state must be presumed to have intended. In addition, later states cannot
be presumed to take into account the "true" motivations for the actions of earlier
states. When later states rely on an earlier statement of opinio juris in the ongoing
process of custom formation, it becomes irrelevant to the outcome that the earlier
state may not have believed its own words. 93 In consequence, where a state expressly
presents a legal rationale for an apparent violation of Article 2(4), it would be incorrect
to imply an opinio juris from the action which conflicts with the legal rationale
provided by the state.

Czechoslovakia (1968)
On the evening of August 20, 1968, troops from five Warsaw Pact nations crossed
into and took control of Czechoslovakia. 94 In defending this apparent violation of
Article 2(4) before the Security Council, the Soviet representative presented a letter
from the Soviet government, in which it was claimed that troops had entered
Czechoslovakia "pursuant to a request by the Government of that State".95 Such an
o The difference between the value of statements made in political contexts and statements
made in legal contexts is one of degree not kind.
91 Cf. supra n.72. at pp.51-52, para.72 (noting the salutary effect of the UN process on
inquiries into opinio juris). Internally, a state may provide a legal rationale to another branch
of the government, or to the people. The examples involving the United States use this
evidence of opinio juris. Where a state's legal system requires internal legal accountability,
internal evidence of opinio juris is probative.
9
See ibid. at pp.50-51, para.71. Also see the quote from the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, supra n.82.
93 See Villiger, supra n.72, at p.2 2 , para.23.
9 See U.N.SCOR, 23rd Sess., 1441st mtg. at p.13, para.137. For further information on the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, see J.N. Moore & R.F. turner, International Law and the Brezhnev
Doctrine (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987) 94-102.
5 See U.N.SCOR, 23rd Sess., 1441st mtg. at p.1, para.3.
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invitation would have removed the situation from the Article 2(4) paradigm. If the
movement of troops across a border is at the request of the government of the
recipient state, then the action would not violate the territorial integrity or political
independence of the state, and would be compatible with the purposes of the Charter,
and therefore outside the prohibition in Article 2(4).96 However, the Soviet version of
events was undercut by the Czechoslovakian representative who presented
communications from his government indicating that the Czechoslovakian
government had not requested or consented to the invasion,97 and actively opposed
the "illegal occupation of Czechoslovakia".98 The US representative was quick to
proclaim that "[w]e all know [the Soviet] claim is a fraud, an inept and obvious
fraud". 99 In the absence of a valid invitation, the Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia was a clear violation of the text of Article 2(4).
The important point is what the Soviets claimed as their legal position. The
Soviet Union offered a legal rationale (Czechoslovakian consent) which was consistent
with international law. The Soviet representative went on to argue that "[t]he decision
of the socialist countries on rendering assistance to the Czechoslovak people is
entirely in accordance with the right of states to individual and collective self-defence,
[and] with the right provided for in

. .

. the Charter of the United Nations.'c° The

Soviet argument was based on a characterization of the situation that seems contrary
to the great weight of the evidence. But the Soviet Union's legal rationale was
uncontroversial and, as the Soviet representative was careful to point out, in
accordance with a textual interpretation of the UN Charter. The Warsaw Pact invasion
turned on a mischaracterization of the facts, not a radical new legal theory that could
supplant Article 2(4).
The Soviet representative did remark that "[tihe events in Czechoslovakia concern
the Czechoslovak people and the States of the socialist sphere of collaboration...
and them alone".' 0' Taken out of context, this might lend itself to the interpretation
that the Soviets believed that their "socialist" right of intervention superseded the
legal norms established in the Charter."°2 But in light of the number of times that the
Warsaw Pact action was claimed to be in accordance with the Charter, 0 3 the statement
can best be seen as a reference to the Soviet argument that because Czechoslovakia
had requested assistance, the situation was a Czechoslovakian internal matter beyond
the scope of the Security Council as a result of Article 2(7) of the Charter,"' and only
6 Presence by invitation is generally considered legal under international law. See M.N.Shaw,
InternationalLaw (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 3rd ed. 1991) 722-3.
97 See U.N.SCOR, 23rd Sess., 1441st mtg. at p.13, para.137.
I Ibid. at p.13, para.138.
9I Ibid. at p.2. para. 11.
'c" Ibid. atp.8, para.90.
1o Ibid. atp.10, para.102.
11 This interpretation would construe the language as a reference to the Brezhnev Doctrine.
Under that doctrine, socialist states supposedly had a right of intervention to prevent other
socialist states from lapsing from socialism. See generally, Moore & Turner, supra n.94. Such
a right would be incompatible with a textual interpretation of Article 2(4).
10 See U.N.SCOR, 23rd Sess., 1441st mtg. at p.1, p.8, p.20, paras.3, 90, 93, 105.
'o' See ibid. at p.26, para.237
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of concern to Czechoslovakia and the socialist states "invited" into Czechoslovakia.
Whatever value the Brezhnev Doctrine may have had as political rhetoric, it was not
relied on as a legal defence following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 05 The Soviet
Union opted for the much more conventional defence of invitation. On the whole,
the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia was a blatant violation of Article 2(4),
but it did not have the opiniojurisnecessary to contribute to a new customary rule
on the use of force.

Grenada(1983)
Turning to a different incident, the United States of America, acting in conjunction
with troops from other countries, landed upon and occupied the Caribbean island of
Grenada in late October of 1983.'1° There was certainly no armed attack by Grenada
against the United States, and there was no Security Council mandate for occupying
Grenada, so the action appeared to be a violation of Article 2(4). In defence of the
invasion, the US claimed three legal justifications: invitation by the Governor-General
of Grenada, a determination to use force by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (the OECS), and the protection of US nationals on the island. 10 7 All three
justifications have been rejected by legal scholars. The Governor-General did not
occupy a constitutional position which would have allowed him to speak for the
government of Grenada, and did not have the power to authorize the invasion.) ° The
treaty of the OECS allowed for collective self-defence against outside threats, not
collective security against member states."° Even if the OECS treaty had provided
for collective security, that provision would have been superseded by the collective
security requirements of the Charter (i.e., Security Council approval) by virtue of
Article 103 of the Charter. Finally, while the protection of nationals in danger in a
foreign country may fall within the self-defence exception of Article 51 of the Charter,"0
the US went far beyond an operation to protect nationals."'
Again, the importance of this example lies in the opiniojuris of the violator. The
US offered three legal justifications, all of which were invalid. Consequently the
Soviet officials and commentators did advocate the Brezhnev Doctrine as a justification for
the invasion in political arenas. See Moore & Turner. supra n.94. at pp.94-102. But on the
one occasion the Soviet Union was before a body which was entitled to a legal explanation, it
is significant that the Soviet Union relied on invitation. See supra text accompanying n.s 8991.
06 See C.C. Joyner, "The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of
Invasion", (184) 78 A.J.I.L. p.131, at pp.131-32.
'0
See M.N. Leich, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law", (1984) 78 A.J..L. p.200, at pp.230- 2 04 (reprinting the argument of the Deputy
Secretary of State before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 2 November 1983).
7
'08 See Joyner, supra n.106, at pp.13 -39.
06 See F.A. Boyle et al., "International Lawlessness in Grenada", (1984)78 A.J.I.L. p.172, at
p.173; Joyner, supra n.106, at pp.135-37.
110 This paper takes no view as to the legality of this position upon a textual reading of Article
51.
See Boyle et al., supra n.109, at p.172; Joyner, supra n.106, at pp.134-35.
'
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invasion was a violation of Article 2(4). However, none of the legal defences extended
by the US were incompatible with the Charter. All three justifications were misapplied,
perhaps disingenuously, but they do not amount to a stated belief that the US had an
extra-Charter legal right to intervene to oppose Marxism-Leninism or install a Westernstyle democracy." 2 In fact, the US executive branch's defence of the action before
Congress concludes with: "We have not made, and do not seek to make, any broad
new precedent for international action; we think the justification for our actions is
narrow, and well within accepted concepts of international law." 3 The executive
branch was wrong, but it did not have the opiniojurisnecessary to have created a
new custom.

Panama (1989)
On December 20, 1989, the United States invaded Panama, overwhelming Panamanian
resistance and capturing the Panamanian head of state, Manuel Noriega.' 4 As part
of justifying the invasion as self-defence, President George Bush gave two reasons:
the declaration by the Panamanian legislature that a state of war existed between the
two countries, and the death of a US soldier at the hands of the Panamanian defence
forces." 5 Neither of these justifications accords with Article 2(4). A mere declaration
of war, without an armed attack, is not sufficient to allow a military response." 6
Similarly, the death of a single soldier does not justify the invasion and overthrowing
of the Panamanian government.' It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the US
invasion of Panama was in violation of Article 2(4). 18
Again, the importance lies in how the US treated its violation. Despite a persuasive
argument that the US justifications were insufficient to invoke self-defence, President
Bush's letter to Congress describing the operation states that "[t]he deployment of
U.S. Forces is an exercise of the right of self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the
United Nations [C]harter".1 9 This language is very important, because it vitiates the
use of the Panamanian invasion to support a new custom of any sort. Rather than
stating that the invasion was a right derived from a new custom that had supplanted
Article 2(4), the US attempted to justify the invasion as a lawful act under the Charter.
By arguing, however incorrectly, that the invasion was justifiable self-defence in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, the US robbed the invasion of the opinio
juris necessary for it to constitute the basis for a new custom.

16

See 0. Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion", (1984) 78 A.J..L. p.645, at
p.648.
See Leich, supra n.107, at p.204.
See Louis Henkin, "The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation",
(1991) 29 Colun,. J. Transnat'l L. p.293, at p.293 (describing the facts of the invasion).
See H.R. Doc. No. 127, 101st Congress, 2nd Sess. (1990).
See Henkin, supra n.l 14, at pp.305-306.

1

See ibid. at p.297.

"9

3 12 3 13
29 5
.
, pp.
See ibid. at p.
H.R. Doc. No. 127, 101st Congress, 2nd Sess. (1990).

"3
11

"5

92 S Ford
Kuwait (1990)
In the early hours of 2 August 1990, Iraqi troops crossed the border and occupied
Kuwait.120 The Iraqi representative explained the position of his government as follows:
"First, the events taking place in Kuwait are internal matters which have no
relation to Iraq.
Secondly, the Free Provisional Government of Kuwait requested my
Government to assist it to establish security and order so that the Kuwaitis
would not have to suffer....
Fourthly, it is the Kuwaitis themselves who in the final analysis will determine
their future. The Iraqi forces will withdraw as soon as order has been restored.
This was the request made by the Free Provisional Government of Kuwait...
Fifthly, there are reports that the previous Kuwaiti Government has been
21
overthrown and there is now a new Government.'
This justification, though not as clear as the Soviet justification in the Czechoslovakian
invasion, 22 is nevertheless an argument about invitation. The Iraqi government
argued that there had been a change of government in Kuwait, and that the newly
constituted government had requested Iraqi assistance in maintaining peace and
security in Kuwait. In another similarity to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Kuwaiti
representative was on hand to undercut the Iraqi version of events. 123 Consequently,
Iraq's statement of the facts was rejected by the Security Council in its adoption of
Security Council Resolution 660 (1990). As in Czechoslovakia, the mischaracterization
of the facts combined with a reliance on an uncontroversial legal defence, robbed the
violation of the opinio juris that would have been necessary for it to have created
new customary law.

A Complete Lack of Opinio Juris
The four examples described above have common threads. All four were blatant
violations of a textual interpretation of Article 2(4). Yet, in none of the examples did
the guilty state claim to be acting on a legal theory that existed outside of the Charter.
All of the defences advanced were uncontroversial ones. Consequently, even though
the defences were misapplied, none of the states presented arguments which indicated
'2

See U.N.Doc. S/PV.2932 [A Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine Hundred

and Thirty-Second Meeting of the Security Council] at p.6.
Ibid. at p.1 1.
1 See supra pp. 88-90.
" The Kuwaiti representative's statement is in U.N.Doc. S/PV.2932 at pp.3-10.
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a belief in a legal right that conflicted with a textual interpretation of Article 2(4). In
the above examples, there is a lack24of opiniojurisfrom which a new customary law
on the use of force might spring.1
Mark Villiger argues that opiniojurisand explicit intent are not identical and that
opiniojurisin a new custom might form without all the parties to a treaty expressing
an intent to depart from that provision. 25 He is concerned that a unanimous express
intent requirement might keep a new opiniojurisfrom forming because of the passive
conduct of states. 26 This is a valid argument. If a number of states advanced a legal
rationale at odds with Article 2(4), and over the requisite number of incidents and
period of time, the other states of the world passively accepted that rationale, then it
might have opiniojuris despite the fact that not every state had explicitly rejected
Article 2(4). But this is not the situation that has occurred. Where the state committing
the violation explicitly claims to be acting in accordance with Article 2(4), then no
opiniojuris for a contradictory new custom can form.
This has been commented on before. In the NicaraguaCase, the ICJ noted with
respect to the prohibition on the use of force in international relations that, "[r]eliance
by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, if
shared in principle by other States, tend towards a modification of customary
international law", but concluded that, "in fact States have not justified their conduct
by reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle". 27
Louis Henkin, in his famous response to Thomas Franck's article' 28 on the death of
Article 2(4), noticed a similar pattern:
"No government, no responsible official of government, has been prepared
or has wished to pronounce it dead. Article 2(4) was written by practical men
who knew all about national interest. They believed the norms they legislated
that has happened in the past
to be in their nations' interest, and nothing
1' 29
twenty-five years suggests that it is not.'
It is not possible here to examine all apparent violations of Article 2(4) in order to
determine how often this lack of opinio juris arises in violations of the textual
interpretation of Article 2(4), but it is the author's belief that a great many, if not the
majority, of violations are justified using uncontroversial legal defences. But there
are cases where an argument might be advanced for opinio juris in a right that
contradicts Article 2(4).

See Akehurst, supra n.71, at p.276 ("IS]ubsequent custom can terminate a treaty only when
there is clear evidence that that is what the parties intend."); Cf. Villiger, supra n.72, at
p.216, para.340.
Villiger, supra n.72, at p.216, para.341.
'
I2
Ibid. at p.216, para.342.
'21
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. Rep. p.14, p.109, para.207.
,_ Franck's article is cited above at n.3.
_9 L. Henkin, "The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated", (1971) 65
4
A.J.I.L. p.54 , at p.547. See also Schachter, supra n.112, at p.648.
'
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East Timor (1975)
Despite Louis Henkin's assertions to the contrary, some states have appeared to
equivocate about the validity of the Article 2(4) paradigm. In the early hours of 7
December 1975, Indonesian military forces invaded and overran the Portuguese
colony of East Timor. 3 ' Portugal was certain that the act was a "blatant, undeniable
violation of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 2, paragraphs 3
and 4".131 Indonesia, on the other hand, accused Portugal of creating a refugee
problem, of failing to stop the persecution of pro-Indonesians, and of armed
incursions into Indonesia. 3 2 It characterized its act as a "respon[se] to the request of
the majority of the people of East Timor, which can certainly not be termed an act of
aggression". 133 Indonesia went on to "reject any notion of aggression being attached
to the action of its people to assist the majority of the people of East Timor... against
a minority which wishes to impose its will by force of arms and deny the people the
exercise of its inalienable right to self-determination".' 3 No explicit legal argument is
made about Article 2(4). In fact, Indonesia studiously avoids defending its actions in
terms of Article 2(4). However, its statement can be interpreted as an implicit rejection
of the Article 2(4) paradigm. Indonesia's argument appears to base a right to intervene
in East Timor on a right of the inhabitants to achieve self-determination. This is at
odds with Article 2(4), because it contradicts the hierarchy set up in Article 1(1).' 3
Indonesia's argument suggests that justice, in the form of self-determination for the
Timorese, should prevail over the Charter's emphasis on peaceful settlement of
disputes, and the prohibition on the use of force in international relations. This is an
implicit argument, but at the least leaves open the question of whether Indonesia
was basing its right of intervention in the Charter, or on the dictates of "justice".

Goa (1961)
A more explicit argument arose in an earlier incident. Fourteen years earlier, Portugal
had been the victim of another apparent violation of the text of Article 2(4). In
December of 1961, Indian forces had crossed into and seized the colony of Goa from
Portugal. 13 6 India's use of force was not Article 51 self-defence or Security Council
authorized collective security, so appeared to be a violation of the Charter. In response,
India attacked the rights of Portugal in Goa, claiming that they resulted from "naked,
unabashed, application of force, chicanery and trickery inflicted on the people of
India 450 years ago". 37 India went on to argue that since the acquisition of Goa had
See U.N.SCOR, 30th Sess., 1864th mtg. at p.7, para.45.
"I Ibid. at p.7, para.48.
112 See ibid. at pp.I 1-12 para.82.
'3
Ibid at p.13, para.93.
'
Ibid. at p.13, para.94.
13 See supra text accompanying n.s 44-45.
See U.N.SCOR, 16th Sess., 987th mtg. at p.6 para.23.
'37
Ibid. at p.8 para.37.
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been illegal, and remained illegal, Portugal had no rights to Goa that could be violated.'38
However, the most incendiary passage in the Indian statement is the following:
"It must be realized that this is a colonial question. It is a question of getting
rid of the last vestiges of colonialism in India. That is a matter of faith with us.
Whatever anyone else may think, Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council,
that is our basic faith which we cannot afford to give up at any cost."' 39
This is very close to an argument that India's right to invade Goa is an inherent right
stemming from the nature of colonialism, and is a superior right to any contained in
the Charter. This is a better example of an argument about justice superseding peace,
in contravention of Article 1(1) of the Charter, than appears in the East Timor incident.
The statement seems to convey the opinio juris necessary to create a customary
right of intervention in direct contradiction of the Article 2(4) paradigm.
Because of the harsh criticism that India received for its radical position,"'4 the
Indian representative hastily qualified his earlier statement. At the next meeting of
the Security Council, the Indian representative announced that:
"We are criticized here by various delegations which say, 'Why have you
used force" The Charter absolutely prohibits force'; but the Charter does not
completely eschew force, in the sense that force can be used for self-defence,
for the protection of the people of a country - and the people of Goa are as
much Indians as the people of any other part of India." '
This is essentially an argument that fits within the same model as the US invasion of
Panama. India claims to be operating in conformity with the Charter, but relies on a
definition of self-defence that is at odds with the text of the Charter. By claiming that
the people of Goa are really Indians as a matter of law, India invokes the right of selfdefence to protect them from the Portuguese. While India's use of self-defence is
incompatible with the Charter's text, India's stated belief that its act is in fact compatible
robs it of the opinio juris necessary to create a new custom. Clearly, India's first
argument is different from its second argument. The first argument comes much
closer to exhibiting the requisite opiniojuris.But India was forced to moderate that
argument at the very next meeting. The result is ambiguous. It also indicates the
pressure a state might have to endure for publicly rejecting the Charter, and is further
evidence that the majority of violations of Article 2(4) are justified using
uncontroversial legal defences and consequently lack the opinio juris to create a
new contradictory custom.

10
38 See ibid. at p.9 para.39. pp.
- 11 para.46.
119 Ibid. at p.9 para.40.
'
See, for example, the statement of the US representative in response to the Indian statement,
beginning at U.N.SCOR. 16th Sess., 987tg mtg. at p.15 para.65.
'4'
U.N.SCOR, 16th Sess., 988th mtg. at p.16 para.77.
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Change Through Treaty Processes
Applicability of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Where opinio juris is lacking, a new custom could not have formed. But it is still
possible that state practice which could not contribute to custom formation might
affect the content of Article 2(4) through a treaty process. This brings us to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty which regulates the establishment
and functioning of other treaties. Despite the doubts about the wisdom of having a
treaty on the law of treaties,' 4 2 the Vienna Convention was signed in 1969 and entered
into force in 1980. Since the Charter was concluded thirty-five years before the entry
into force of the Vienna Convention, the Convention does not apply, as a treaty, to
the Charter.'43 However, Article 4 of the Vienna Convention leaves open the possibility
that some provisions of the Convention may apply "independently" of whether a
given treaty is subject to the Convention. This is a reference to the possibility that
some provisions of the Vienna Convention may represent customary international
law. To the extent that provisions of the Convention represent customary
international law, those provisions would apply to all treaties, including the United
Nations Charter.
Today, many provisions of the Vienna Convention can be said to represent
international custom. 45 Most importantly, the rules on the interpretation of treaties,
Articles 31-33, are generally accepted as codifying customary rules. 46 On the other
hand, Article 53, concerning the status of jus cogens, is the most controversial
provision of the Vienna Convention, and the one least likely to state a customary
"
norm. 47
' The result is that Articles 31-33 do apply to the interpretation of the United
Nations Charter, while Article 53 most likely does not apply to the Charter.

Dismissing the Obvious
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties gives a concrete form to those
processes of change having to do with treaties. By codifying custom, the Convention
takes an ephemeral principle and gives it a specific form.'48 While still open to
interpretation, the words of the Vienna Convention are much more concrete than the
customs they codified. Perusing the Convention suggests a number of processes by
142
143

1
141

'7
'

See Sinclair, supra n.10, at pp.3-5.
See Vienna Convention art. 4.
See Sinclair, supra n.10, at pp.7-8.
See ibid. at pp.10-21.
See Simma, supra n.74, at p. 3 0; Sinclair, supra n.10, at p.19 ("IT]here is now strong judicial
support for the view that the rules of treaty interpretation incorporated in the Convention
are declaratory of customary law.").
See Sinclair, supra n.l0, at pp.17-18.
Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.and F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. p.3, at
p.41.
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which the content of Article 2(4) might have been modified. However, the majority of
these can be dismissed out of hand:
1.

Article 2(4) has not been superseded by a newer treaty covering the same
subject matter. 49 In fact, the interaction of Article 103 of the Charter and
Article 30(1) of the Vienna Convention may prevent the dilution of Charter
obligations by subsequent treaties.

2

Article 40 of the Convention is superseded by Articles 108 and 109 of the
Charter. There has been no formal amendment of Article 2(4) of the Charter.

3.

Article 103 of the Charter prohibits modification of the Charter terms between
two or more of the parties to the Charter as suggested by Article 41 of the
Convention.

4.

No member of the UN could avoid Article 2(4) through arguments about
internal law, restrictions on authority to express consent, error, fraud, or
corruption of a representative as set forth in Articles 46-50 of the Convention.
Continued membership in the UN since 1945 acts as acquiescence in the
validity of the treaty, thereby barring the above arguments. 50

5.

There has never been a formal decision to suspend the operation of Article
2(4) in accordance with Article 57 of the Convention.

There are other possibilities suggested by the Vienna Convention, but only two
need to be addressed in detail. The validity of Article 2(4) may have been diminished
by desuetude. That possibility will be discussed next. It is also possible that
subsequent state practice under Article 2(4) might have "interpreted" the meaning
of the prohibition on the threat or use of force.' 5' The possibility of interpretation
through state practice will be addressed below.

Desuetude
A number of writers have implicitly or expressly identified desuetude as a process by
which Article 2(4) has been diluted. Traditionally, desuetude was a process that
allowed for the deconstruction of customary rules. 5 2 Custom requires a general
practice that has some measure of uniformity and consistency. If there are sufficient
violations of the rule, then there will not be uniformity and consistency, and the
custom may cease to exist.5 3 Arend, Franck and Rostow, amongst others, appear to

'4

See Vienna Convention art.30 (allowing for supercession by newer treaties covering the same
subject matter).

's

's'
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See ibid. art. 45(b).
See ibid. art. 31(3)(b).
See Villiger, supra n.72, at p.55, para.79.
See ibid. at p.55, para.79.
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believe that desuetude is also a treaty process.'54 They argue that there have been
sufficient violations of Article 2(4) to conclude that it no longer has legal force.
There are significant problems with this argument. Article 42(2) of the Vienna
Convention states that termination of a treaty can only result from the provisions of
that treaty or from the default provisions in the Convention. The Charter certainly
does not provide for termination as a result of desuetude, and the closest thing to
desuetude in the Vienna Convention is Article 54(b). Article 54(b) allows for the
termination of a treaty "[a]t any time by consent of all parties after consultation with
the other contracting states". This seems to require a formal act following formal
consultations. It also requires the consent of all the parties. In addition, Article 44 of
the Vienna Convention holds that termination may only be invoked with respect to
the whole treaty, except in some inapplicable situations. This would mean that
termination could not apply only to Article 2(4) but would terminate the whole Charter.
This has certainly not happened.
On the other hand, the Convention does not apply, as a treaty, to the Charter.
Only those provisions which are also customary would be applicable, and there is
some doubt about whether the provisions on termination represent customary
international law.'55 In addition, the ILC has suggested that desuetude is included in
the Vienna Convention through Article 54(b) since the necessary consent to terminate
the treaty can be implied from the conduct of the parties.' 56 This is at odds with an
"ordinary meaning" interpretation of Article 54(b) which appears to require formal
consultation and consent.
There are clearly problems with accepting desuetude as a treaty process by
which Article 2(4) might have been changed, but assuming, arguendo,that desuetude
is possible does not mean that it has occurred. Desuetude is the abandonment of a
treaty or a treaty provision, but more than just violations, or even a pattern of
violations, would be needed to abandon a treaty. Treaties are the result of the express
consent of all the parties to be bound by the treaty. A single party does not have the
power to terminate a treaty for other states unless this is specifically provided for. It
is not surprising that Article 54(b) of the Vienna Convention requires the consent of
all the parties to a treaty in order to terminate that treaty. At the least, desuetude
would seem to require an express or implicit intent to abandon a treaty coupled with
the express or implied consent of the other parties.'57 The discussion of opiniojuris
suggests that most violations of a textual interpretation are accompanied by legal
rationales which would negate any claim of an express or implied intent to abandon.'58
Further, the majority of these legal rationales are rejected by the states of the world,
negating any claim of implied consent. 5 9 In short, even if one accepts that desuetude
does exist as a treaty process, there it is little evidence that it has occurred to Article
"I See
'5
See
'
See
'5
See
'5
See
15 See

supra n.68.
Sinclair, supra n.10, at pp.14-15.

ibid. at pp.163-64.
ibid. at p.164. See also supra n.67.
supra pp. 85-95.
infra.
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2(4), since states regularly concede the validity of Article 2(4) even while violating a
textual interpretation of it.

A Classification Scheme for Uses of Force
The violations discussed above suggest that international uses of force can be
broken down into categories. Such a classification scheme would look like this:
L

Uses of force outside of the scope of Article 2(4). Example: The continued
presence of US troops in South Korea by invitation

I.

Uses of force consistent with the text of Article 2(4). Example: Kuwait's use of
force against the invading Iraqi troops

m.

Uses of force inconsistent with the text of Article 2(4):
A. Mischaracterizations of the fact situation in order to use uncontroversial
defences. Example: the Soviet Union's claim of invitation in
Czechoslovakia.
B. Uncontroversial defences applied to inapplicable fact patterns. Example:
the US claim of self-defence in Panama.
C. Legal defences based on legal rights incompatible with the text of Article
2(4). Example: India's first statement in the Security Council on Goa.
D. Apparent violations unaccompanied by legal rationales.

I and II above would not change Article 2(4). Only III is inconsistent with the text of
Article 2(4) and might lead to a change. Yet within III, only III(C) and II1(D) have the
necessary intent to create contradictory custom or could imply an intent to abandon
Article 2(4). And as India's moderation of its first argument before the Security
Council indicates, these situations may be a small percentage of the actual violations
of Article 2(4). The largest number of uses of force inconsistent with the text of
Article 2(4) probably occur under Ill(A) and HI(B). Yet these do not have the opinio
juris to create new customs or the intent to abandon Article 2(4), because the states
that employ them purport to be acting in accordance with Article 2(4). This leaves
the problem of how to treat categories Il1(A) and Ill(B).
The International Court of Justice, when confronted with an analogous problem,
argued essentially that categories Ill(A) and 1I(B) should be ignored:
"If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather
16
than to weaken the rule.' 0
"6

Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. Rep. p.14, p.99 at para.186.
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Because of the procedural setting of the NicaraguaCase, the ICJ was construing
what it found to be a custom which paralleled Article 2(4), not Article 2(4) itself. But
if this logic were applied directly to Article 2(4) it would mean disregarding violations
falling into III(A) and Ill(B).
There is a problem with accepting the ICJ's logic. It is insufficient to say that the
uncontroversial legal argument presented does not fit the factual model for that legal
defence, and therefore cannot change the textual interpretation of Article 2(4). Part
of the problem is the positivist nature of international law. States make international
law, whether it be by treaty or by custom, not the ICJ. It also seems at odds with the
intent with which the states in the examples treated their own legal arguments. Take
for example India's second statement before the Security Council. 6' India argued
that its invasion of Goa was self-defence because Goans were really Indians, and
therefore the Portuguese occupation of Goa was essentially an armed attack against
India. This does not accord with the text of the Charter, but in a way, India is making
a claim about how it believes self-defence should be defined. India's action in Goa
can be seen as an "offer" to rewrite the text of the Charter to take into account the
immorality of colonialism. Because it is an offer to redefine the Charter, not to do
away with the Charter, it is not an argument that gives rise to a new contradictory
custom. However, under a legal regime created by states, India's offer should not
just be ignored.
And in fact, there is a way to take into account such offers to modify the meaning
of the text of treaties. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1969) states that treaties are to be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning
of their words in light of their objects and purposes, and in accordance with their
context. 162 The Vienna Convention goes on to state that "subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation" shall be taken into account along with the context of the treaty.'63
This allows what might be termed "interpretive acts" to modify the interpretation of
the "ordinary meaning" of the treaty terms. Thus India's interpretive act under Article
31 (3)(b) in Goa might have modified the meaning of self-defence to allow the use of
force against lingering colonialism.

INTERPRETIVE ACTS
At first glance, the conclusion that violations of Article 2(4) often cannot contribute
to a new custom but sometimes can "interpret" the Charter may appear to be a
change in name, without legal effect. This would be true if the requirements for
custom formation and the requirements for treaty interpretation through subsequent
practice were the same. If the criteria for the two processes are different, then acts
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See supra text accompanying n.141.
Vienna Convention art. 31(1).
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Ibid. art. 31(3)(b).
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which might contribute to custom formation, might not be capable of treaty
interpretation, and vice versa. Thus, the important question becomes, what is the
test of successful treaty interpretation through subsequent practice?' A close reading
of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention suggests that "interpretive acts" are subject
to a test of "good faith agreement". It is a single test, but springs from two different
sources, the requirement of agreement and the requirement of good faith. These two
sources will be examined independently, followed by a proposed definition of "good
faith agreement".

Agreement
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that:
"1.

A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose...

3.

There shall be taken into account, together with the context: ...
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."

The requirement of agreement is explicitly set out in the text of Article 31 (3)(b).
Interpretive acts must establish the agreement of the parties."6 This stems from the
contractual nature of treaties. They are formed out of the express consent of all the
parties. In order for their meaning to be changed through interpretation, the acts
which are alleged to have interpreted the treaty must be such as to show the agreement
of the parties to the interpretation.

Good Faith
"Good faith" is mentioned as essentially the first guide to treaty interpretation in
Article 3 1(1) of the Vienna Convention. Since "interpretive acts" are to be considered
See Waldock Report V1, Observations and proposals of the Special Rapporteur, par. 18
reprinted in R.G. Wetzel (ed)., The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Travaux
Preparatoires (Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1978) 247 ("Clearly, to amount to an
'authentic interpretation', the practice must be such as to indicate that the interpretation has
received the tacit assent of the parties generally."); ILC Commentary to Article 27 of the
1966 ILC Draft of the Vienna Convention, par. 15, Report of the Commission to the General
Assembly, U.N.Doc. A/6309/Rev.l reprinted in 1966 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm. p.169, at p.222
("The value of subsequent practice varies according as it shows the common understanding of
the parties as to the meaning of the terms."). Cf., Sinclair, supra n.10, at p.137 ("The value
and significance of subsequent practice will naturally depend on the extent to which it is
concordant, common and consistent.").

102 S Ford
with the "context" of a treaty, they are also subject to "good faith," 165 which has
66
been recognized by the ILC as "the fundamental principle of the law of treaties".
The ILC went on to argue that "a means should be found in the ultimate text of any
convention on the law of treaties ... to emphasize the fundamental nature of the
obligation to perform treaties in good faith". 67 Accordingly, Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention (subtitled Pacta Sunt Servanda) states that "[e]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".
Good faith also appears in Article 2(2) of the Charter of the United Nations:
"All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting
from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in
accordance with the present Charter."
It would be more surprising to see a treaty which did not contain a good faith
provision, because the requirement of good faith is not a treaty principle in the usual
voluntarist sense (i.e., it is not a provision which drafting states are free to include or
not include).161 It is a fundamental consequence of the contractual nature of
agreements between states. The process of working out rules to govern the behavior
of states only has value if states are bound to apply those rules. 69 A document
which states are not bound in good faith to implement is not a treaty, and looks more
like a "gentleman's agreement",7 0 or something even less. It is worth pointing out
that in some circumstances, states may even be bound in good faith to implement
unilateral declarations. 7 '
As a study of the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda demonstrates, good faith in
the execution of agreements has been recognized since the dawn of recorded
11

See Sinclair, supra n.10, at p.120.

66 ILC Commentary to draft Article 23 of the 1966 ILC draft of the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, supra n.164.
Ibid.
16 See Sinclair, supra n.10. at pp.2-3. See also J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 3rd ed. 1942) 39-46 (addressing the source of obligation in international
167

law).
11 H. Wehberg has stated that 'the principle of sanctity of contracts is an essential condition of
any social community.' Hans Wehberg, 'Pacta Sunt Servanda', (1959) 53 A.J.I.L. p.775, at

p.786.
11
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See M. Bothe, "Legal and Non-Legal Norms A Meaningful Distinction in International
Relations", (1980)11 Neth. YB. Int'l L. p.65, pp.70-75 (providing a brief history of gentlemen's
agreements); M. Nash, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law", (1994) 88 AJ.I.L. p.515, at p.515 (providing a brief history of gentlemen's agreements);
0. Schachter, "The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements", (1977) 71
A.J.I.L. p.296, p.299 (describing gentlemen's agreements as precise and definite agreements
which are not legally binding but which presume compliance).

See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. Rep. p.253, pp.2 67 -6 8 (setting out the elements
of a binding unilateral declaration). The Court explicitly bases the duty to implement unilateral
declarations on the dictates of good faith. Ibid. at 268 ("Just as the very rule of pacta sunt
servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an
international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration."). See also Shaw, supra n.96, at
p.98 (containing citations to additional material on unilateral declarations).
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history. 7 2Numerous ancient cultures recognized it. It existed in Roman law, Christianity
and Islam. It was widely accepted in the Middle Ages. Despite its occasional
detractors, it was accepted by such 16th and 17th century thinkers as Vitoria, Suarez
and Grotius. 73 The most serious attacks on good faith came from Hobbes and Spinoza,
who argued that the state was justified in doing anything in order to protect its
interests, including breaking its own agreements. This conclusion was disputed
vigorously by Vattel in the 18th century, who pointed out that rather than being
detrimental to security, the sanctity of contracts made possible both security and
commerce. 71 Today, there are few who would dispute the norm of pacta sunt
servanda.'75 This is true, not because of the doctrine's long and illustrious history,
nor because it appears in both the United Nations Charter and the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, but because "if a contract, validly concluded, were not
binding, then international law would be deprived of a decisive foundation and a
society of states would not longer be possible."' 76

If the whole edifice of modem treaty law is based on the duty of states to fulfill
their treaty obligations in good faith, then it is clear that treaty interpretation must
also be subject to a duty of good faith. Indeed, the ILC has concluded that the duty
177
to interpret treaties in good faith "flows directly from the rule pacta sunt servanda".
Consequently, it appears prominently in Article 3 1(1) of the Vienna Convention.
A Test of "Good Faith Agreement"
No Distinction Between Interpretation and Modification
Interpretive acts must demonstrate agreement and good faith, which leads to the
question, what is good faith agreement?' One possibility is that even if states can
show agreement to interpret a provision by the parties, that provision still cannot be
interpreted if its terms are unambiguous. This position was advanced by the Thai
delegation to the 1966 draft of the Vienna Convention, which objected that subsequent
practice could not "be used to frustrate the natural meaning of the words or to extend
the scope of the original terms.' 178 Elisabeth Zoller claims to find a similar meaning of
good faith agreement in a 1950 advisory opinion of the ICJ. 79 She argues, based on
the decision in Interpretationof Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, 80 that there is a distinction between interpretation and modification of a

1

See Wehberg, supra n.169,at p.786 (describing the history of pacta sunt servanda). See also
P.K. Menon, The Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations (Lewiston:
Edwin Mellen Press, 1992) (tracing the history of pacta sunt servanda) pp. 55-61.
See Menon, supra n.172, at p.56; Wehberg, supra n.169, at p.778.
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treaty. States are allowed by their subsequent practice under Article 31 (3)(b) of the
Vienna Convention to interpret a provision by practice that establishes agreement,
but modification is not allowed, notwithstanding the acceptance of the practice by
the parties.' 8 ' Presumably she means that provisions which are ambiguous are open
to interpretation, but that to change a clear provision would be modification rather
than interpretation. The ICJ decision on which this is based does indeed seem to
draw a distinction between interpretation and modification (revision). The Court, in
refusing to provide relief, stated that it is "the duty of the Court to interpret Treaties,
not to revise them". 8 2 Using this definition of good faith agreement, states could not
advance practice which sought to interpret "black" to mean "white" or "three" to
mean "four". If states did advance these sorts of interpretive acts, they could not
change the meaning of the treaty provision even if the parties to a treaty were to
agree that it did. In order to modify unambiguous provisions, states would have to
follow the treaty's formal amendment procedure.
This argument is belied by another ICJ decision.' 83 In 1971, the ICJ faced the
problem of interpretive acts under the Charter. The Court rejected an argument that
Security Council Resolution 284 (1970) was invalid because two of the permanent
members had abstained from voting rather than casting concurring votes. Article
27(3) of the United Nations Charter requires that "[d]ecisions of the Security Council
on all other matters'8" shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including
the concurring votes of the permanent members". It was argued that an abstention
was not a concurring vote, and that consequently Resolution 284 had not been
validly passed.'85 However, since 1946 a practice has been adopted in the Security
Council that an abstention by a permanent member is treated as a "concurring" vote
under Article 27(3). 186 The ICJ concluded that decisions of the permanent members
"extending over a long period.., have consistently and uniformly interpreted the
practice of voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not constituting a bar to
the adoption of resolutions".1 7 The Court concluded that this practice had been
"generally accepted" by UN members, and constituted a "general practice" of the
188

UN.
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See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia,
1971 I.C.J. Rep. p.6, at p.22 para.21.
See C.A. Stavropoulos, "The Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members of
the Security Council Under Article 27, Paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations",
(1967) 61 A.J.I.L. p.737.
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The ICJ made no mention of a distinction between interpretation and modification,
in a case which would have seemed a perfect example of Zoller's rule if it existed.
There is not much ambiguity in "concurrence". And there is a distinct difference
between "concurrence" and "abstention". That the Court allowed "concurrence" to
become "abstention" implies that a distinction between interpretation and
modification cannot be maintained. Interpretive acts can make what might be termed
"modifications". Indeed, as Stavropoulos noted, the outcome of concluding that all
Security Council resolutions passed with an abstention are invalid would be farreaching and absurd.'89

The Reaction of Other Partiesto an InterpretiveAct
There is a better way to derive a concrete test from the duty of good faith agreement.
It would be inordinately hard to articulate an objective definition of "good faith"
which private observers of international law could conveniently apply to the myriad
disparate acts which occur under the many treaties currently in force. Yet it is not
imperative that private observers have an objective definition of good faith. Good
faith is a duty which states owe to each other, for without good faith treaty obligations
would be worthless. Since states are owed the duty, and presumably understand
what is good faith in international relations, it is best left to states to identify acts in
bad faith by other states.
States are presumptively harmed by all acts in bad faith, which decrease the
overall value of treaty commitments, giving them an incentive to object to acts which
they perceive to be in bad faith. A state's decision about the character of an
interpretive act is likely to revolve around a cost/benefit analysis. Since any violation
of the text of a treaty dilutes the overall value of treaty commitments by making
treaties less certain methods of regulating the behavior of states, this will probably
be weighed against what the state perceives to be the value of the interpretation that
is being proposed by the act of another state. Where the value of the proposed
interpretation exceeds the cost of decreasing the value of treaty commitments, the
state will perceive the act as in good faith. Where the value of the proposed
interpretation is less than the cost of decreasing the value of treaty commitments the
state will probably perceive the act as in bad faith. Each state will make its own
calculation about the utility of an interpretive act, and an objection is primafacie
evidence that the state considers the proposal to be in bad faith.
This is not to say that for various reasons, individual states will always object to
acts which states in general perceive as in bad faith. Individual states may remain
silent where the act was committed by a close ally, or where the state is contemplating
a similar bad faith act.' 9 Yet on the whole, the average response of states will most
likely reflect the general perception of whether an act is in good faith or bad faith.
And where states do not object, as in the interpretation of Article 27(3), then the
11 See Stavropoulos, supra n.186, at pp.744-45.
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practice is in good faith.' 9' Thus the private observer does not need an objective
definition of good faith, but merely has to monitor the reaction of other states.
Where a practice is advanced to which a significant number or even a majority of
states which are party to the treaty object, that act cannot lead to an interpretation of
the treaty, no matter how many times it is performed by individual states. A practice
91 2
may therefore have uniformity and consistency of a sort, yet still be in bad faith.
Such a practice could not interpret a treaty provision.
In some ways, this definition of good faith is the opposite of opiniojuris.Rather
than looking at the belief of the acting state, we look at the reaction of other states.
Where opiniojurisis inward-looking, good faith is outward-looking. Were we to try
and determine good faith from the attitude of the acting state, we would invariably be
unable to trust our conclusions. The state which is acting in a way which is contrary
to a binding treaty provision in the hope of changing it, or of just getting away with
the violation, always has an incentive to assert that its act is in good faith. Only by
looking at the collective response of the other parties can we determine whether the
body of parties to the treaty think the interpretation is in their best interests. Since
good faith agreement is defined in a different way from opinio juris, not all acts
which would meet the criteria of custom would meet the criteria for an interpretive
act. And the fact that states have often framed the legal rationales for apparent
violations of Article 2(4) in ways which negate their use as the basis for opiniojuris
may have a real outcome on the current status of Article 2(4).

The ICJ: A Problem for the Proposed Definition
Three ICJ decisions are relevant to any discussion of treaty interpretation through
subsequent practice. The Peace Treaties Case has already been discussed, and the
distinction between interpretations and modifications rejected.'93 That rejection was
based on the Court's treatment of Article 27(3) in the Namibia Case. It will shortly be
argued that the outcome of the Namibia Case was correct, but that the test apparently
used by the Court was incorrect. 194 Since the rejection of the Peace TreatiesCase is
based on the outcome of the Namibia Case rather than the Court's test in that case,

'9o

'91

'g,
'9
'9'

For example, the only two non-participants to vote against G.A. Res. 38/7 (1983) (condemning
the US-led invasion of Grenada) were El Salvador and Israel, both client states of the US at the
time. See infra n.215.
If enough states endorse an act, that act is per se in good faith, even if it is based on an
inaccurate assessment of the utility of the interpretation (i.e., in the long run the act will
actually harm the states accepting it by lowering the overall value of treaty commitments by
more than the gain from the interpretation). Good faith is a duty owed to states and applied
by states, it is not up to private observers to question the law made by states because it is not
in their best interests. Observers are entitled to point out the miscalculation, hoping to
change the behavior of states.
See infra text accompanying n.s 200-203.
See supra pp. 103-105.
See infra text accompanying n.s 203-204.
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the rejection of the Peace Treaties Case remains valid despite the argument that the
method by which the Court arrived at the outcome in the Namibia Case was flawed.
There is no basis for a distinction between permissible interpretations and
impermissible modifications by subsequent practice. As the practice of the members
of the Security Council with respect to Article 27(3) shows, interpretations can change
the apparently unambiguous meaning of words.
The second relevant case is the Cofu Channel Case. The Coifu Channel Case
was referred to the ICJ by a Special Agreement between the United Kingdom and
Albania.'95 Albania later contested the Court's right to fix compensation, arguing
96
that the Special Agreement had not given the ICJ jurisdiction to fix compensation.1
The ICJ examined the subsequent practice of the parties (in this case the nature of
the pleadings and argument before the Court) to determine whether the parties had
intended that the ICJ fix compensation. Albania had contested the claims of damage
and had tried to reserve the right to address the amount of compensation if their
motion to dismiss the case was not granted.'97 The ICJ concluded that "[t]he
subsequent attitude of the Parties shows it has not been their intention, by entering
into the Special Agreement, to preclude the Court from fixing the amount of the
compensation".' 98 The ICJ does not explain the basis for its decision or offer any test
by which to measure the interpretive acts of the parties.
Since the Special Agreement was a bilateral agreement, it was intuitively obvious
that Albania, in responding to the facts of the United Kingdom's compensation
claim rather than immediately contesting jurisdiction for such a claim, had
authoritatively interpreted the treaty. Bilateral treaties are relatively simple, there are
only two parties, and an interpretive act by one which is not immediately objected to
by the other is presumably a good faith interpretation. The Court reached this rather
obvious result without examining the nature of interpretive acts. So while the outcome
in the Corfu Channel Case was correct, the case itself is not a source of understanding
of interpretive acts. The simplicity of the case allowed a decision without a
comprehensive explanation.
The third relevant case is the Namibia Case.' 99 In upholding the Security Council's
interpretation of Article 27(3) of the Charter, the ICJ seemed to focus on the consistency
and uniformity of the interpretive acts. 20° While this led to the correct outcome in
that case, it will not lead to the correct outcome in all cases. Where the act is in good
faith, practice will be consistent and uniform. Likewise, if the act is in bad faith,
practice may well also be consistent and uniform. When an interpretive act is
undertaken in bad faith, the overall decrease in the value of treaty commitments is
shared by all states. The decrease is apportioned out amongst all the parties to the

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. p.4, at p.24.
'9
196See ibid. at p.23.
191 See ibid. at p.25.
191 Ibid.
199 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 1971
I.C.J. Rep. p.6.
2
See supra text accompanying n.187.
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treaty, possibly amongst all parties to all treaties. The actual decrease felt by the
individual violator may well be smaller than the short term benefit to be gained from
violating the provision. As long as to other states the benefit to be gained from the
violator's intended interpretation is less than the cost of the decrease in the value of
treaty commitments, they will perceive the attempted interpretation as in bad faith.
The important thing is that while the other states perceive the act as in bad faith, it
will still be in the interest of the violating state.2"' Consequently the violator may
pursue action which is on the whole detrimental, and which other states oppose. 202
Yet, a state that had opposed the action when undertaken by another might well
undertake the same action when put in the previous violator's position. States will
have a somewhat hypocritical incentive to act in bad faith while condemning the bad
faith actions of other states. This seeming paradox is demonstrated by the positions
of the superpowers during the Cold War. When the Soviet Union attempted to bend
the Charter rules, the United States opposed it. When the United States attempted to
bend the Charter rules, the Soviet Union opposed it. The weighing of costs and
benefits caused each state to pursue their own bad faith actions, while opposing the
bad faith actions of others. This led to a certain uniformity and consistency of
action. A test of uniformity and consistency is not an appropriate test for interpretive
acts. Interpretive acts are subject to a test of "good faith agreement" which can only
be measured in the reaction of states. Any test that takes into account the attitude of
the violator will be a poor way to discriminate between good faith and bad faith. 03
The explanation for the Namibia Case may well lie in the intuitiveness of the
outcome, and a failure to closely examine the underpinnings of practice qua custom
as opposed to practice qua treaty interpretation. One can see a similarity between
the consistency and uniformity test in the Namibia Case and the requirements of
custom formation. The ICJ's language in the Namibia Case is reminiscent of Article
38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, describing customary international law. Thus the ICJ
referred to the interpretation as a "general practice" of the UN that was "generally
accepted" by the members." 4 No doubt the answer was obvious, there had been
twenty years of absolutely consistent practice and no opposition. Perhaps the Court
seized on the first test which seemed to explain what they intuitively knew to be the
correct answer. The Court seemed to apply the test of practice in custom formation
without considering that interpretive practice springs from a different source of law
and might well be subject to a different test. If that is true, then an opportunity to

2o1 Much of the cost/benefit analysis at p 105 is based loosely and by analogy on Garrett Hardin's

article entitled "The Tragedy of the Commons", (1968) 162 Science p.1243. Writing about
population growth, Hardin eloquently demonstrated how systems sometimes operate to
foster activity which is profitable to the individual, but detrimental to the whole.
20 With reference to the use of force in international relations, this presumes the failure of the
UN's collective security machinery. If that machinery were operating as intended, then the
states of the world, acting together, could impose a high enough cost on violators to deter
violations in situations where no individual states would have sufficient incentive to intervene
against the violating state.
203 See supra text following n.192.
204

See supra n.188.
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revisit the issue in a more difficult case might lead to a different outcome. The ICJ
could face a case where it is clear that the validity of the interpretation is the lack of
objection, not the uniformity and consistency of the interpretive act.

GOOD FAITH AGREEMENT
It is time to take another look at the classification scheme that was proposed earlier.2 °5
It is now possible to incorporate the effects of the various categories of action into
the overall classification scheme. The result would look like this:
L

Uses of force outside of the scope of Article 2(4). Result: This would depend
on whether the use of force was governed by custom or treaty, and the nature
of the justification offered. The general rules for custom formation and treaty
interpretation would apply.

H1.

Uses of force consistent with the text of Article 2(4). Result: No effect on the
interpretation of the text.

M.

Uses of force inconsistent with the text of Article 2(4).

A.

Mischaracterizations of the fact situation in order to use uncontroversial
defences.
Result: This will be treated as an attempt at treaty interpretation through
subsequent practice, and will be subject to the test of good faith agreement.
As a practical matter, it seems likely that the resort to factual misrepresentations
will be the result of a self-serving act, and that states will reject such offers of
interpretation.

B.

Uncontroversial defences applied to inapplicable fact patterns. Result: This
will also be treated as an interpretive act. If the other parties do not object,
then over time the interpretive act may become an authoritative interpretation
of the treaty. This would mean that the presence of the previously inapplicable
fact pattern is now a valid reason to invoke the legal defence. Objection by a
significant number of states prevents the interpretive act from changing the
meaning of the treaty terms, no matter how often it is committed.

C.

Legal defences based on legal rights incompatible with the text of Article 2(4).
Result: These acts may lead to a new custom supplanting the treaty provision
on a specific point. Whether this has occurred would depend on the practice
meeting the requirements of custom formation. The practice would have to be
"general" and have opiniojuris. If there were a pattern of violations based on
express legal rationales incompatible with Article 2(4), but the rationales for
the various violations were mutually incompatible, then there might be an
abandonment of Article 2(4) without the creation of a new custom to fill the

2 5

See supra p 99.
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void. This would be desuetude. If a pattern of acts is insufficient for custom
formation or desuetude, it has no effect.
D.

Apparent violations unaccompanied by legal rationales Result: No legal
rationales accompany these actions, so the intent of the actions has to be
implied from the act. Since the actions are incompatible with Article 2(4), the
implied intent will probably also be incompatible with Article 2(4). The implied
intent may support opiniojuris in an emerging custom (provided that the
pattern of violations is sufficiently uniform and consistent), be used as
evidence of desuetude (if the pattern of violations is sufficient to indicate
abandonment but not consistent enough to indicate a new custom), or may
have no effect (if the totality of violations does not amount to a new custom
or desuetude).

What is clearly called for is an examination of the current status of Article 2(4) as a
result of the introduction of categories III(A) and III(B). Unfortunately a thorough
examination of all the apparent violations of the textual interpretation of Article 2(4)
in order to place those acts into the classification scheme and determine their result
is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper will look at the outcomes of
some of the situations discussed earlier.

Czechoslovakia (1968)
The Soviet Union relied on an invitation defence in its invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The basis of this defence was refuted by the Czechoslovakian government.
Consequently, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a violation of Article 2(4). It was
lacking in the opinio juris necessary to have constituted part of a customary
modification of the Charter,2°6 and can only be considered an attempt at treaty
interpretation through subsequent practice. As such, in order to have interpreted
the meaning of Article 2(4), there would have to have been good faith agreement
amongst the other parties to the Charter. The General Assembly never managed to
pass a resolution on the incident,0 7 but seventy-six speakers condemned the
invasion. 200 In addition, a draft resolution condemning the invasion was brought
before the Security Council. It was vetoed by the Soviet Union, but received 10
votes in favor.209 Over the coming weeks, an additional ten states addressed letters
to the President of the Security Council protesting the invasion. 210 The result is not
206 See supra pp. 88-90.
2'
The lack of General Assembly action on the issue might be attributable to the Czechoslovak

206

21
211

request that the issue be removed from the Security Council agenda following hasty negotiations
between Soviet and Czechoslovakian representatives. Yearbook of the United Nations 1968
at 303 (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information).
"Summary of Developments During the Twenty-Third Session of the U.N.General Assembly",
(1969) 63 A.J.I.L. p.569, pp.569-70.
See Yearbook of the United Nations 1968 at pp.300-302.
See ibid. at p.303.
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as clear as it would have been if there had been a General Assembly resolution
condemning the invasion, but a significant number of states did object. This prevented
the formation of good faith agreement.

Grenada (1983)
As has been suggested earlier, the invasion of Grenada by the United States was a
violation of the textual interpretation of Article 2 (4 ),2 but the US action did not have
the requisite opiniojuris to constitute an attempt at the formation of a new custom.
In short, the invasion of Grenada was an "offer" to interpret the Charter through
subsequent practice (a category Ill(B) interpretive act). Consequently, the U.S.
invasion may have established interpretations to: broaden the definition of who may
invite the presence of foreign forces, change the balance of power in Article 53 of the
Charter in favor of regional security organizations, and broaden the definition of
self-defence to allow the overthrow of foreign governments where necessary to
protect the lives of nationals. These would have been far-reaching changes to the
textual interpretation of Article 2(4), but would not have been barred simply for that
reason. 12 If the other members of the UN had treated the proposed interpretation as
in good faith, then the meaning of Article 2(4) would have been changed. 213 But the
vast majority of the members of the UN rejected the interpretive act. In General
Assembly Resolution 38/7 (1983), the General Assembly condemned the "armed
intervention" in Grenada as a "flagrant violation of international law", and called for
an "immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops". 214 The resolution was passed by a
vote of 108 to 9. The only states apart from the ones which actually had troops in
Grenada to vote against the resolution were El Salvador and Israel, 2 5 both US client
states. The import is clear. The states of the world considered the invasion to be in
bad faith. Consequently it could not have any interpretive effect, despite the fact
that the US was able to block any concrete action against itself because of its
permanent membership on the Security Council. The legal effect of the 'invasion of
Grenada was a nullity. It could not form custom because it did not have the requisite
opiniojuris,and it could not interpret Article 2(4) because it was in bad faith.

211
212
213

214
211

See supra p. 90.
See supra.
Actually, a single act probably does not constitute an authoritative interpretation, but since
the invasion of Grenada is being examined out of context with the other acts which might
collectively indicate the proposed interpretations, it will be presumed that a single act would
interpret the Charter. The ability of a single act to interpret a treaty is related to the number
of parties, and the number of objections. The more parties and the more objections (though
still, of course, less than a significant number), the more acts it takes to demonstrate agreement.
In this respect, the Charter is difficult to interpret because of its essentially universal
membership.
G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N.GAOR (1983).
See Joyner, supra n.106, at p.139 n.52.
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Panama (1989)
Similarly to Grenada, the invasion of Panama was a violation of the textual interpretation
of Article 2(4).216 Since it lacked the opiniojuristo have contributed to a new custom,
if it had any effect on the prohibition on the use of force in international relations, it
would have to have been as an interpretive act. But in General Assembly Resolution
44/240 (1989), the General Assembly condemned the "invasion of Panama" as a
"flagrant violation of international law" and demanded the immediate withdrawal of
US troops from Panama. 217 Resolution 44/240 was adopted by a vote of seventy-five
in favor, twenty opposed, with forty states abstaining." 8 Clearly there was no good
faith agreement to this possible interpretation of Article 2(4). No law was formed as
a result of the invasion of Panama, either in the form of a treaty interpretation or as a
new custom.

Generalizing from the Situations Covered
Examining three situations does not prove that the majority of interpretive acts
under Article 2(4) have been rejected. But it was not meant to, rather the situations
were presented as a complement to the cost/benefit analysis already conducted.
Assuming that, viewed objectively, the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4)
is better for the average state than a looser norm which allows self-defined "just"
acts, what predictions would one make?' One could predict that individual (mostly
militarily powerful) states in specific situations would calculate a short-term advantage
to a looser prohibition, even though on the whole the stricter prohibition remains
best for the majority. Consequently, violations would occur if there was no effective
enforcement machinery for the prohibition. However, one would also predict that
states would oppose the violations, since from their perspective there is no shortterm advantage and only the long-term cost. This is exactly what appears to have
happened, and the violations in Grenada, Panama and Czechoslovakia illustrate this
phenomenon.
The simple fact of violation does not mean that the legal norm has changed.
Indeed, since interpretive acts are subject to a test of good faith agreement, one
might predict that a large number of violations would be rejected as interpretations
of the language of Article 2(4). Again, this appears to be what has happened. It is the
author's belief that a majority of violations of the text of Article 2(4) will be accompanied
by legal justifications which limit their potential effect to that of an interpretive act. It
is the author's further belief that a majority of these will fail as interpretations of
Article 2(4).

216
217
211

See supra p. 91.
G.A. Res. 44/240 U.N.GAOR (1989).
See K. Matsuura et al., (eds)., Annual Review of United Nations Affairs 1989, vol. 1, (Dobbs
Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1990) 45.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Need for an Explanation
This paper is founded on the premise that at the moment the United Nations Charter
came into force, it was binding on the parties. This means that at some point, Article
2(4) was the prohibition on the use of force in international relations. In order to
argue that the prohibition has changed, one must begin with the textual interpretation
of Article 2(4), and demonstrate a legal process for any asserted change. Many
writers have touted the death of Article 2(4), but few have articulated a convincing
process by which this could have happened. The legal processes by which Article
2(4) could realistically have been changed are limited. They boil down to two real
possibilities: an abrogation of Article 2(4) (either through desuetude 21 9 or the formation
of a new contradictory custom), or the interpretation of the existing language.
Both are possibilities, but the intent of states in the majority of incidents reviewed
is at odds with abrogation. This is not to say that it could not have happened. India's
first statement before the Security Council on the Goa incident certainly flirts with an
intentional abandonment of the Charter, while the basis of Indonesia's intervention
in East Timor is studiously vague. The fact of a violation might lead to the inference
that the intent was to abrogate Article 2(4) if no other justification was given, but in
the majority of the cases examined here (and the author thinks it likely that this would
hold true over the majority of violations), states presented a specific legal rationale
which conformed with the Charter. India's flirtation with abandonment was shortlived, providing an example of the pressure that can be brought to bear on a state
willing to reject the Charter. Given the careful statements of intent that have
accompanied most violations of the prohibition on the use of force, both desuetude
and the formation of a contradictory custom seem unlikely.
While the intent of states seems to negate an argument about abrogation, there
is still the possibility of an interpretation of the meaning of Article 2(4) through
subsequent practice. This process is recognized both in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties and in the decisions of the ICJ. Indeed, the legal rationales that
accompany violations often seem to act as "offers" to interpret the meaning of a
component of Article 2(4). The use of self-defence advocated by the United States
after the invasion of Panama is a good example of this phenomenon. "Self-defence"
as used by the United States in Panama has little to do with a textual interpretation of
self-defence. Thus the invasion, and the legal justification offered can be seen
together as an offer to interpret the meaning of Article 2(4).

Good Faith Agreement
The frequency with which such interpretive acts are offered leads inevitably to the
219 The author is not convinced that desuetude is a valid process of treaty change, but this paper

assumes for the sake of argument that it is a valid treaty process. See supra pp. 97-99.
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question of how to tell which acts have actually interpreted the Charter. The test of
good faith agreement advocated here stems from the wording of Article 31 (3)(b) of
the Vienna Convention and the principle of pacta sunt servanda. In order to
authoritatively interpret the meaning of a treaty provision, an act cannot be objected
to by a significant number of the parties to the treaty. The cost/benefit analysis
implies that the majority of self-serving interpretive acts will be rejected. Some
interpretations will be accepted, but this will occur when the vast majority of states
perceive the interpretation to be in their best interest. The interpretation of
"concurrence" in Article 27(3) of the Charter is a perfect example. The ability of a
permanent member to show disapproval through abstaining without having to veto
a resolution gave the Security Council greater flexibility and was accepted as a good
faith interpretation by members of the United Nations. If history is any guide, most
2
violations of Article 2(4) will be self-serving, and will be rejected. 1

The Current Status of Article 2(4)
To refer back to Anthony Clark Arend's nomenclature, 22' this paper can probably be
classified as a defence of the "legalist" position. But this defence does not stem from
a blind attachment to the text of Article 2(4). The text is the starting point of any
discussion, but the Charter is flexible and has been changed by the actions of states,
and Article 27(3) is a prominent example of this process. But not all practice
automatically changes the legal norms established by the Charter. Indeed it has been
one of the central arguments of this paper that most subsequent practice has failed
to change the interpretation of Article 2(4). This raises the question: In which areas
is there evidence of a deviation from the textual interpretation of Article 2(4)?' The
analysis of others suggests that the textual meaning of Article 2(4) may have been
changed through good faith interpretive acts in the following circumstances:
1.

A textual reading of Article 2(4) makes it clear that threats of force are every
bit as prohibited as actual uses of force. Yet it appears that threats of force are
rarely objected to, and may have been accepted by a majority of the states in
the world as being legitimate in some instances.222

2.

Armed reprisals will usually be illegal under a textual interpretation of Article
2(4) because they will rarely be in direct response to an armed attack, and
therefore will not meet the requirements of Article 5 1. Yet it appears that at

220

In fact, history may not be a guide. With the end of superpower rivalry, the post-Cold War
period appears to be one of greater co-operation and UN activism in the field of collective
security. The result may be a world in which there are fewer self-serving uses of force, and
growing agreement to interpret Article 2(4) through subsequent practice to permit, for
example, humanitarian intervention or even democratic intervention.

221 See supra text accompanying n.s 62-64.
222 See, e.g., R. Sadurska, "Threats of Force", (1988) 82 A.J..L. p.239; Schachter, supra n.35,
at p.1625.
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least one reprisal has not generated objections from a significant number of
states. 223 The lack of objection to the 1993 US airstrike on Iraq combined with
the US reliance on Article 51 appears to indicate a good faith interpretive act
which has the possibility of broadening the definition of self-defence to
include some armed reprisals. While a single interpretive act is unlikely to
modify a universal treaty, 224 it does suggest some uncertainty about the
existence of a right of armed reprisal within the definition of self-defence.
Clearly, more scholarship would be required to review the 1993 airstrike in the
context of other instances of armed reprisal to determine whether Article 51
25
now contains a limited right of reprisal.
These two issues are offered only as tentative suggestions, and there may well be
other areas that have undergone change. 226 There is a distinct possibility that the
prohibition on the use of force in international relations is no longer quite the textual
interpretation of Article 2(4). The author is not automatically opposed to arguments
that the meaning of Article 2(4) has changed, but is opposed to arguments that do
not clearly present a legal process for that change.

Legal Norms vs. Reality: A Fatal Disjunction?
Many of the "rejectionists" have based their arguments on the gap between the text
of Article 2(4) and the reality of conflict in the post-Charter years. They point to the
hundreds of violations and question whether any law that is so rarely and sporadically
enforced could continue to be a legal norm. 227 Such authors often point to the failure
of the collective security machinery in the Charter as further evidence of the
obsolescence of Article 2(4). Arend goes so far as to argue that "recognizing the
death of article 2(4) may help demonstrate how far states have strayed from the
22
Charter paradigm and encourage efforts to return to it".1
This paper has argued that while violations have been widespread and enforcement
sporadic, most states have rejected the attempts of others to change the prohibition
on the use of force. The problem with Article 2(4) is the failure of the collective
security provisions to provide a counter-balance to the individual state's incentive
to violate in specific instances. It is not a failure of the Article 2(4) paradigm, which
most states recognize and apply as law except when they themselves are the ones

2' See G. Stuart and N. Baker, "Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986
Bombing of Libya: The New Interpretation of Article 51", (1994) 24 Ga. J. Int' & Comp. L.
p. 9 9 .

See supra n.213.
2' Derek Bowett's article on armed reprisals is an excellent beginning but does not consider
2'

"interpretive acts" and is now somewhat dated. See D. Bowen, "Reprisals Involving Recourse
to Armed Force", (1972) 66 AJ.I.L. p.l.
226There may also be areas which are currently undergoing change. See supra n.220.
22' See supra.
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Arend, supra n.6. at p.37.
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doing the violating. It would be a cruel irony if we were to overhaul the Charter in
order to make the collective security apparatus more effective 2 9 only to find that
there remains no law to enforce. We must campaign for the strengthening of the
collective security provisions of the United Nations, but to reject the legal norm
because of a lack of enforcement is not only contrary to the expressed intent of the
states of the world, but akin to throwing out the baby with the bath water.

"_9

This might be done by eliminating the permanent member veto and implementing Article 43.

